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The purpose of the present article is to assess the degree of competition within 
the enlarged European Union (EU) commercial banking system during the period 
ranging from 2004 to 2011 using the non-structural test developed by Panzar and Rosse 
(1987). Their procedure measures the competitive environment in which financial 
intermediaries operate employing the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form interest 
revenue with respect to factor prices. 
The main conclusion to retain from this study is that banking industry in the 
region does not seem to have operated either under perfect competition or under perfect 
monopoly, but rather consistently with long-run monopolistic competition. Further, we 
also find empirical evidence of efficiency hypothesis posted by Demestz (1973) and 
Peltzman (1977), as opposed to conventional view that concentration impairs price 
competitiveness. Finally, we underline the importance of trade off between the costs and 















Banks play a prominent role in the allocation of economic resources. 
Furthermore, they exert a fundamental influence on asset transformation, payment 
system, transmission of monetary policy, maintenance of financial stability, and thereby 
are a key determinant to economic growth and development. The vital role of banks in 
the economy makes the issue of banking competition largely important. In this context, 
the evaluation of the competitive environment in which financial intermediaries operate 
appears to be broadly justified.  
The present article seeks to assess competitive conditions in the new enlarged 
EU commercial banking landscape over the period 2004-2011. Therefore, this paper 
augments previous studies by using contemporaneous banking data from 2000s. 
In the empirical part, we focus on the non-structural model stated originally in 
Panzar and Rosse (1987). This approach estimates a reduced-form equation relating 
banking revenues to a vector of input prices and other control variables. The associated 
measure of competition, the so-called H-statistic, is obtained as the sum of elasticities of 
income with respect to unit prices of input.  
The database employed in this paper is the bank-level information contained in 
balance sheets as well as income statements reported by relevant commercial banks to 
the BankScope over the period beginning in 2004 and ending in 2011. 
The main conclusion to retain from this study is that banking industry in the 
region does not seem to have operated either under perfect competition or under perfect 
monopoly, but rather consistently with long-run monopolistic competition. Generally 
speaking, our finding is in keeping with comparable studies in the literature, which also 
point to monopolistic competition in EU countries. Second, we also find empirical 






as opposed to conventional view that increase in concentration should be linked to a 
decrease in competition. Last, but no least, we underline the importance of role played 
by banking regulators and supervisors to reach a desirable degree of competition in 
bank system.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review on the subject, whereas Section 3 presents the methodology and data 
employed. Afterwards, estimations results are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 




















2. Literature Review 
Theory suggests that banking competition can be inferred directly from the 
markup of prices over marginal costs (Lerner, 1934). In practice, however, this measure 
is often hard or even impossible to implement due to a lack of detailed information on 
the cost and prices of bank products.  
The literature has proposed various indirect techniques to assess the competitive 
environment in which financial intermediaries operate. These methods can be divided 
into two main streams: structural and non-structural approaches.  
Structural measures may, in turn, be divided into two major schools of thought: 
the formal and non-formal frameworks. The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm and the EH are the two most common non-formal structural approaches. The 
former hypothesis, originally due to Bain (1951), predicts that more concentrated 
markets are more collusive, while the latter, which stems from Demsetz (1973) and 
Peltzman (1977), supposes that the overall concentration level faced by banks depends 
positively on the degree of market competition.  
Although lacking formal back up in micro-economic theory, they have 
frequently been applied to the banking industry and provide policy makers measures of 
market structure and performance, as well as their interrelationship. For example, 
Bikker and Groeneveld (1998) present empirical evidence of concentration impact on 
competitive structure in the EU as a whole as well as in individual EU countries during 
the period 1989-1996. Their results support the widespread view that concentration 
impairs competitiveness. A few years later, Bikker and Haaf (2002a) also provide 
support for the SCP paradigm employing a panel data of 23 industrialized countries 
inside and outside Europe over approximately 10 years. In the same vein, Corvoisier 






ranging from 1993 to 1999. This paper suggests that the ongoing process of banking 
consolidation in the euro area countries may substantially reduce competition, 
especially in segments where geographic proximity or informational asymmetries are 
important (loans, demand deposit) while efficiency structure has substantially increased 
in others (savings and time deposits). More recently, Rozas (2007) also find evidence 
for EH focused on a sample of Spanish commercial and savings banks. 
In reaction to the theoretical and empirical shortcomings attributed to the 
structural stream, three non-structural models of banking competitive behavior have 
been developed within the emerging New Empirical Industrial Organization framework. 
This new category comprises the models developed by Iwata, Bresnahan and Panzar-
Rosse (hereinafter PR). 
The latter approach estimates a reduced-form equation relating banking revenues 
to a vector of input prices and other control variables. The associated measure of 
competition, the so-called H-statistic, is obtained as the sum of elasticities of income 
with respect to unit costs of input. Given an estimate of the H, different situations may 
arise. If H is negative the bank is neoclassical monopolist or collusive oligopolistic, 
between 0 and 1 is a monopolistic competitor and equal to unity is a competitive price-
taking bank in long-run competitive equilibrium. This way, the approach heavily relies 
on the premise that banks will employ different pricing strategies in response to a 
change in input costs depending on the market structure in which they operate.  
This technique has been much more widely used in empirical bank studies 
mainly due to its simplicity and transparency, without lacking efficiency. Moreover, 
data availability becomes much less of a constraint, since revenues are more likely to be 
observable than output prices necessary in other models. Finally, the non-necessity to 
define the location of the market a priori implies that the potential bias caused by the 






In this context, we provide a review of the studies that have applied the PR 
methodology in the banking industry, both in regional and single-country level.  
The first category (multi-country approach) includes works presented by Bikker 
and Groeneveld (1998), Bikker and Haaf (2000a, b), Mamatzakis, Staikouras and 
Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2005), Al-Muharrami, Matthews and Khabari (2006), Bikker, 
Shaffer and Spierdijk (2009), Kasman (2010) and Delis (2010). Particularly, Bikker and 
Haaf (2002a) assess competitive conditions in the banking markets of as many as 23 
industrialized countries inside and outside Europe over approximately 10 years. Their 
estimated PR model provides strong evidence that the banking markets in the industrial 
world are characterized by monopolistic competition, but perfect competition cannot be 
ruled out in some cases. Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2005) test a sample of 
banks from Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Romania as well as Serbia for the period 1998-2002. Their empirical study 
also suggests that banks in the South Eastern European region earn interest and total 
revenue under condition of monopolistic. Bikker and Haaf (2000b), Bikker and 
Groeneveld (1998), Al-Muharrami, Matthews and Khabari (2006), Kasman (2010) as 
well as Delis (2010) document the same empirical results. Indeed, this conclusion is 
most plausible for characterizing the interaction between banks, as it recognizes the 
existence of product differentiation and is consistent with the observation that banks 
tend to differ with respect to product quality variables and advertising, although their 
core business is fairly homogeneous. For example, Bikker and Haaf (2000b) find that 
monopolistic competition is the prevailing outcome in the studies applying the PR 
method to European countries.   
The second category of studies includes the investigation of competitive 






Pranckeviciute, 2007; Gischer and Stiele, 2008; Boucinha and Ribeiro, 2009; Daley and 
Matthews, 2011; Shin and Kim, 2013). For example, Yuan (2006) presents an empirical 
assessment of the competitiveness of the Chinese banking industry during the period 
ranging from 1996 to 2000 and observes high competition even before its accession to 
the World Trade Organization. Gischer and Stiele (2008) examine the German banking 
system (more than 400 savings banks) over the period 1993-2002. The empirical results 
indicate that banks revenues appear to be earned in conditions of monopolistic 
competition. Furthermore, they find that small banks seem to enjoy even more market 
power than larger institutions. These results are supported by a study by Boucinha and 
Ribeiro (2009) as well as Mlambo and Ncube (2011) for the Portuguese and the South 
African banking groups, respectively. Daley and Matthews (2011) as well as Shin and 
Kim (2013) also find evidence of monopolistic competition. However, according the 
last study, monopolistic competition in the Korean banking industry exists but the 
degree of competition has improved after bank restructuring and consolidation 
conducted by Korean government during Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998. 
Therefore, even with increased concentration through bank consolidation and a 
reduction in the number of banks, competition is found to be higher, as banks are 
maximizing their interest revenues.  
Finally, a growing body of the banking competition literature has focused on 
emerging economies. Among these studies, Yildrim and Philippatos (2007) analyze the 
evolution of competitive conditions in the banking industries of 14 Central and Eastern 
European countries for the period 1993-2000. The empirical results suggest that the 
banking markets of these countries cannot be characterized by the bipolar cases of either 
perfect competition or monopoly except for Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and the Slovak Republic. Similar findings are reported by Gelos and Roldos (2004) as 






degree of competition in the banking sector of the South Eastern European region over 
the period ranging from 1998 to 2002, and reach the conclusion that banks also earn 
their interest and total revenue under conditions of monopolistic competition. 
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed an indicator to discriminate between 
oligopolistic, monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive markets on the 
basis of the comparative static properties of reduced-form revenue equations. This 
indicator measures the extent to which a change in factor input prices is reflected in the 
equilibrium revenues earned by banks. Under certain restrictive assumptions, it can be 
interpreted as a measure of the overall level of competition prevailing in a particular 
landscape. In other words, this methodology relies heavily on the premise that banks 
will employ different pricing strategies in response to changes in factor input prices 
depending on the competitive behavior of market participants.  
Following Bikker and Haaf (2002a), let´s consider the log-linear marginal cost 
(MC) function of representative bank i during year t (dropping subscripts referring to 
bank i over year t): 
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where OUT is output of the bank, FIP are the factor input prices and        are other 
exogenous variables to the cost function. Equally, the underlying marginal revenue 
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where       are variables related to the bank-specific demand function. 
For a profit-maximizing bank, marginal costs equal marginal revenues in 
equilibrium, yielding the following equilibrium value for output (denoted by an 
asterisk): 
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The reduced-form equation for revenues of the representative bank i during year 
t is the product of the output equilibrium value and the common price level (p), 
provided by the inverse-demand equation,             ∑        .  
In empirical analysis, the following operationalization of the reduced-form 
revenue equation is used: 
                                     ∑   
 
   
                       
The dependent variable, IR, is the ratio of total interest revenue to the total 
balance sheet. The decision to consider only the interest income is consistent with the 
underlying notion in the PR model that financial intermediation is core business of most 
banks.  
AFR (Average Funding Rate), PCE (Price of Capital Expenditure) and PPE 
(Price of Personnel Expenses) are the unit prices of the considered banking inputs: 
funds, labour and capital. The three costs are generated by dividing interest expenses by 
total deposits, depreciation and other capital expenses to fixed assets and personnel 







Input prices are followed by a set of bank-specific factors which, basically, are 
intended to catch differences in risk, business mix and size. Specifically, these control 
variables include: L (Loans to Total Assets), NPL (Non-performing Loans to Total 
Assets), DB (Deposits from Banks to Deposits and Short-term Funding), DDC (Demand 
Deposits from Customers to Deposits and Short-term Funding) and OI (Other Income to 
Total Assets). Finally, ε is the disturbance term. 
A positive parameter for L is expected, because more loans reflect more 
potential interest income. The coefficient for OI is probably negative as the generation 
of other income may be at the expense of interest revenue. Regarding the signs of the 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables, there are no strong a priori expectations. 
Table VI contains the correlation matrix of aforementioned set of variables 
involved in the empirical analysis. As expected, the dependent variable exhibits a 
positive association with the total loans scaled by total assets. Further, the correlation 
between the interest revenue and non-interest income is negative. Noticeably, low 
values are reported for other bank-specific variables in the first column (IR). These 
figures suggest the finding of insignificant coefficients in the next step of the analysis, 
which is devoted to the estimation of the econometric model presented in equation (4).  
As discussed above, the H-statistic is given by the following expression: 
  ∑   
 
   
                                                                                                                                         
This indicator determines the banking competitive behavior evaluating the 
elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to changes in unit prices of factor.  
The estimated value of the H-statistic ranges from minus infinity to unity. A 







oligopoly. In both cases, an increase in input prices will translate into higher marginal 
costs, a reduction of equilibrium output and, subsequently, a fall in total revenues. 
Under perfect competition, the H-statistic equals to unity. In this particular situation, an 
increase in input prices rise both marginal and average costs without distorting the 
optimal output of any individual banks. Exit from the market will evenly increase the 
demand faced by each of the remaining banks, thereby leading to an increase in prices 
and total revenue by same amount as the rise in costs. Finally, if the H is between zero 
and unit, the market structure is characterized by monopolistic competition. In this case, 
potential entry leads to contestable market equilibrium and income increases less than 
proportionally to the input prices as the demand for banking products facing individual 
banks is inelastic. 
Since PR is a static approach, a critical feature of H is that the test must be 
undertaken on observations that are in long-run equilibrium. An equilibrium test relies 
on the premise that in competitive capital markets, risk-adjusted rates of return will be 
equalized across banks. In such a case, the rates of return will not be correlated with 
input prices. In practice, an equilibrium test is provided by PR model, after replacement 
of the dependent variable by rate of return on total assets or equity. The resulting 
statistic is supposed to be significantly equal to zero in equilibrium and significantly 
negative in opposite case. In addition, the model also assumes a price elasticity of 
demand greater than unity and a homogeneous cost structure. Finally, the performance 
of banks needs to be influenced by the actions of the other market participants.  
The simplicity and transparency of this methodology explains its popularity in 
the study of competition in banking markets. For instance, it does not require price and 
quantity data on the services provided by banks, an issue that can often be problematic 
in the estimation of empirical structural equations of banks´ behavior, either because 






concerns establishing a measure of their quantity. Another appealing property of this 
methodology is the fact that it allows for the inference of the interaction between inputs  
price shocks to the cost function and revenue function, without requiring the estimation 
of output demand or cost function. In addition, the non-necessity to define the location 
of the market a priori implies that the potential bias caused by the misspecification of 
market boundaries is avoided.  
Last, but no least, the applicability of the PR model is much broader and not 
confirmed to banks only. For example, Panzar and Rosse (1987) assess the competitive 
climate in the newspaper industry. 
 
 
The PR model has been applied to banks from 26 EU countries, as listed in 
Table I. Only Luxembourg has been excluded, since some of the relevant observations 
are lacking. 
The database employed in this study is the information contained in balance 
sheets and income statements reported by EU commercial banks to the BankScope, a 
privately owned financial database maintained by Bureau van Dijk, over the period 
beginning 2004 and ending in 2011. We have restricted the analysis to commercial 
banks only to avoid comparing institutions with different products, clientele as well as 
objectives. Further, for each country, we have considered just information of two largest 
banks, ranked by assets, because of high concentration. 
For each country, Table I also contains the number of commercial banks as well 
as share of the two largest commercial banks in total assets (CR2 %) during year 2011. 
CRn is the percentage market share of the n largest depositary institutions, ranked 






Remarkably, concentration degree prevailing in enlarged EU commercial 
banking system is extremely high during year 2011, namely in main economies (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom).   
































Note: This table lists the EU countries included in the sample. Only Luxembourg has been excluded, 
since some of the relevant observations are lacking. Further, it reports the number of commercial banks 







 CR2  
   
Austria  69 52,13% 
Belgium 97 39,28% 
Bulgaria 28 29,50% 
Cyprus 24 58,51% 
Czech Republic 34 42,41% 
Denmark 68 68% 
Estonia 12 86,06% 
Finland 15 79,22% 
France 257 36,34% 
Germany 223 55,30% 
Greece 28 43,89% 
Hungary 42 41,31% 
Ireland 28 42,55% 
Italy 195 37,50% 
Latvia 32 33,27% 
Lithuania 16 53,75% 
Malta 11 66,21% 
Nethrland 60 52,15% 
Poland 73 23,30% 
Portugal 41 48,87% 
Romania 24 58,51% 
Slovakia 24 43,49% 
Slovenia 29 45,79% 
Spain 101 56,77% 
Sweden 30 79,49% 
United Kingdom 203 36,78% 








4. Empirical results 
The reduced-form revenue function (equation 4) stated in previous section is 
linear in its unknown parameters. This way, in order to exploit both the cross-sectional 
and the time-series dimensions of the panel dataset, we have employed the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method.   
Table II displays OLS regression results. The estimate of the elasticity of interest 
income with respect to each of the considered three inputs proves to be positive. Given 
the fact that funding is the main factor in the production function of banks, it is hardly 
surprising that its elasticity is the largest one, followed by the coefficient of labour. 
From Graph I, it is also observable that over the period comprised between 2004 and 
2011 funding and labour coefficient appear to be the main contributors to H-statistic. 
Indeed, this result is common in the PR literature and implies that excess physical 
capital (probably including branches) does not generate abnormal revenue. Moreover, 
the unit costs of the all banks’ inputs are statically significant at conventional 
confidence levels. 
Estimation results also reveal that H differs significantly from both 0 and 1, 
providing evidence that a certain degree of monopolistic competition in the EU banking 
market is present. A priori, this conclusion is most plausible for characterizing the 
interaction between banks, as it recognizes the existence of product differentiation, on 
the one hand, and is consistent with the observation that core banking business is fairly 








Table II. Determinants of Interest Revenue Ratio, 2004-2011 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.365865 (0.251569) 1.454333 0.1468 
LOG(AFR) 0.383959 (0.036114) 10.63197 0.0000 
LOG(PCE) 0.147121 (0.034301) 4.289162 0.0000 
LOG(PPE) 0.356232 (0.073685) 4.834491 0.0000 
R-squared 0.535537    
           F-statistic 126.4485    
       Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the regression model:           
                            , where   is the disturbance term and log is the natural 
logarithm. The dependent variable is the logarithm of interest revenue scaled by total assets. Variables 
AFR, PCE and PPE are the unit prices of three inputs: (AFR) the ratio of interest expenses to total 
deposits; (PCE) the ratio of depreciation and other capital expenses to fixed assets and (PPE) the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets. The H-statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticities of interest revenue 
with respect to three input prices:              . The model is estimated by running least square 
regression on a pooled sample of the 26 EU countries over the period beninging in 2004 and ending in 
2011. P-values are presented in bold and standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
Graph I. Series of Interest Income and Unit Costs of Inputs 
Note: Graph is showing the logarithmic series of banking revenues and inputs prices, such that IR: Ratio 
of Total Interest Revenue to the Total Balance Sheet; AFR: Average Funding Rate; PCE: Price of Capital 
Expenditure; PPE: Price of Personnel Expenses. 
 
 
To test whether banks-specific factors are unduly omitted, the table III presents 


















variables, which are intended to catch differences in risk, business mix and size, 
include: L (Loans to Total Assets), NPL (Non-performing Loans to Total Assets), DB 
(Deposits from Banks to Deposits and Short-term Funding), DDC (Demand Deposits 
from Customers to Deposits and Short-term Funding) and OI (Other Income to Total 
Assets). In general, they do not heavily affect the base-components of H-statistic. First, 
all costs remain statistically significant at conventional levels. Second, funding and 
labour coefficients appear to be the main contributors to H-statistic, as in the previous 
equation. Further, EU banks seem to have operated under monopolistic competition. 
Generally speaking, our findings are in keeping with comparable studies in the 
literature, which also point to monopolistic competition in EU countries. Particularly, 
Bikker and Haaf (2002a) provide strong evidence that the banking markets in 23 
industrialized countries inside and outside Europe are characterized by monopolistically 
competitive practices over the period beginning in 1988 and ending in 1998. 
From a theoretical perspective, however, there are still conflicting views on the 
optimal level of competitiveness. Increased competition in the banking markets will 
benefit investments and economic performance, while too much competition may also 
lead to moral hazard activities and increased risk exposure. Remarkably, this trade-off 
context enhances the role played by regulators as well as supervisors, inasmuch as 
certain prudential tools may turn out to provide a necessary buffer against adverse 
developments. 
Regarding the coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables, the ratio of 
loans to total assets (L), reflecting risk, has a positive coefficient. The reported 
coefficient for this variable seems plausible because more loans reflect more potential 






of other revenue to total assets yields a negative sign. Finally, the share of customer 
loans that have defaulted during each year does not have shown to be significant. 
 
TABLE III. Determinants of Interest Revenue Ratio, 2004-2011 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.067602 (0.180621) 0.374275 0.7084 
LOG(AFR) 0.383959 (0.036114) 10.63197 0.0000 
LOG(PCE) 0.074160 (0.022889) 3.239998 0.0013 
LOG(PPE) 0.294904 (0.049093) 6.006997 0.0000 
LOG(L) 0.012819 (0.017049) 0.751885 0.4527 
LOG(NPL) -0.005302 (0.025604) -0.207066 0.8361 
LOG(DB) 0.779839 (0.044188) 17.64801 0.0000 
LOG(DDC) 0.015598 (0.012877) 1.211321 0.2267 
LOG(OI) -0.030796 (0.004611) -6.678873 0.0000 
R-squared 0.818766    
           F-statistic 181.8381    
       Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Note: The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the regression model:           
                           ∑             where   is the disturbance term and log is the 
natural logarithm. The dependent variable is the logarithm of interest revenue scaled by total assets. 
Variables AFR, PCE and PPE are the unit prices of three inputs: (AFR) the ratio of interest expenses to 
total deposits; (PCE) the ratio of depreciation and other capital expenses to fixed assets and (PPE) the 
ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. Bank-specific factors included in the model are the ratio of 
loans to total assets (L); the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (NPL); the ratio of deposits from 
banks to deposits and short-term funding (DB); the ratio of demand deposits from customers to deposit 
and short-term funding (DDC) and the ratio of other income to total assets.  The H-statistic is equal to the 
sum of the elasticities of interest revenue with respect to three input prices:              . The 
model is estimated by running least square regression on a pooled sample of  the 26 EU countries over the 





Before completing the analysis of the banking competition, one issue remains to 






the test must be undertaken on observations that are in a long-run equilibrium. Using 
return on equity, we find that the hypothesis of equilibrium (H=0) cannot be rejected 
because the different inputs are few significant at conventional significance level, as 
indicated in TABLE IV. This justifies the applied methodology. 
TABLE IV. Determinants of Return on Equity, 2004-2011 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C -0.433443 (0.268438) -1.614687 0.1074 
LOG(AFR) -0.045011 (0.038314) -1.174791 0.2409 
LOG(PCE) 0.087738 (0.034067) 2.575409 0.0105 
LOG(PPE) 0.272149 (0.073123) 3.721789 0.0002 
LOG(L) 0.026200 (0.025540) 1.025845 0.3057 
LOG(NPL) 0.064596 (0.038777) 1.665844 0.0967 
LOG(DB) 0.491241 (0.065703) 7.476736 0.0000 
LOG(DDC) 0.046515 (0.019200) 2.422631 0.0160 
LOG(OI) -0.032229 (0.006855) -4.701261 0.0000 
R-squared       0.515781    
F-statistic 42.74035    
         Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
Note: The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the regression model:           
                           ∑             where   is the disturbance term and log is the 
natural logarithm. The dependent variable is the logarithm of equity scaled by total assets. Variables 
AFR, PCE and PPE are the unit prices of three inputs: (AFR) the ratio of interest expenses to total 
deposits; (PCE) the ratio of depreciation and other capital expenses to fixed assets and (PPE) the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets. Bank-specific factors included in the model are the ratio of loans to 
total assets (L); the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (NPL); the ratio of deposits from banks to 
deposits and short-term funding (DB); the ratio of demand deposits from customers to deposit and short-
term funding (DDC) and the ratio of other income to total assets.  The H-statistic is equal to the sum of 
the elasticities of interest revenue with respect to three input prices:              . The model is 
estimated by running least square regression on a pooled sample of the 26 EU countries over the period 
beginning in 2004 and ending in 2011. P-values are presented in bold and standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
According to the SCP paradigm (Bain, 1951), an increase in concentration 





empirical evidence regarding the behavior of the EU banking sector during the period 
under scrutiny. Indeed, our estimation outcome leads to conclude that there is apparent 
positive connection between competition and concentration. This result is grounded on 
EH due to Demestz (1973) and Peltzman (1977). According to this approach, if a bank 
achieves a higher degree of efficiency than other banks in the market (i.e. its cost 
structure is comparatively more effective), its profit maximizing behavior will allow it 
to gain market share by reducing prices.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This article sought to assess competitive conditions in the new enlarged EU 
commercial banking environment during the period ranging from 2004 to 2011, using 
the widespread non-structural test developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). 
Firstly, our estimation outcomes lead to conclude that, during the period under 
scrutiny, EU banking sector seem to have earned their interest income under conditions 
of monopolistic competition.  
From a theoretical perspective, this conclusion is most plausible for 
characterizing the interaction between banks, as it recognizes the existence of product 
differentiation and is consistent with the observation that core banking business is fairly 
homogeneous. Further, monopolistic competition is the prevailing outcome in the 
studies applying the PR method to EU countries.  
According social welfare, however, there are still conflicting views on the 
desirable degree of competition. Increased competition in the banking markets will 
benefit investments and economic performance, while too much competition may also 
lead to lower market power and profitability of banks, weakening their ability to 





In this context, forthcoming research efforts ought to direct attention towards the 
common fundamentals underlying competition and market structure in banking 
industries. Particularly, building strong institutions and effective governance are key 
elements for avoiding financial distress that may be caused by increased competition 
pressures. 
Remarkably, trade off between the costs and benefits of competition enhances 
the role played by banking regulators and supervisors to support financial stability 
objectives. Thereby, issues such as banking supervision, corporate governance, 
accounting standards and auditing procedures need to be brought in line with best 
practice. This is particularly true to financial structure of European economies since are 
characterized more by bank financing than by direct financing in the market. 
Last, but not least, our empirical study reports an apparent positive relation 
between competition and concentration. This result contradicts conventional view 
which holds that increasing concentration may lead to undesirable exercise of market 
power. Nevertheless, nowadays this empirical result is a plausible feature for EU 
banking system where waves of mergers and acquisitions have translated into 
containment of average production costs. Indeed, there has been a tremendous emphasis 
on the importance of improved efficiency in the banking sector, and thereby an 
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Table VI. Correlation Matrix 
 
LOG(IR) LOG(AFR) LOG(PCE) LOG(PPE) LOG(L) LOG(NPL) LOG(DB) LOG(DDC) LOG(OI) 
LOG(IR) 1 
        LOG(AFR) 0,52 1 
       LOG(PCE) 0,55 0,15 1 
      LOG(PPE) 0,6 0,23 0,79 1 
     LOG(L) 0,75 0,29 0,3 0,27 1 
    LOG(NPL) 0,12 -0,08 0,33 0,31 0 1 
   LOG(DB) -0,23 0,04 -0,47 -0,44 -0,14 0,04 1 
  LOG(DDC) 0,04 -0,28 0,19 0,24 -0,24 0,07 -0,29 1 
 LOG(OI) -0,47 -0,03 -0,22 -0,26 -0,39 -0,02 0,15 -0,13 1 
Note: IR: Ratio of Total Interest Revenue to Total Assets; AFR: Average Funding Rate; PCE: Price of 
Capital Expenditure; PPE: Price of Personnel Expenses; L: Loans to Total Assets; NPL: Non-performing 
Loans to Total Assets; DB: Deposits from Banks to Deposits and Short-term Funding; DDC: Demand 
Deposits from Customers to Deposits and Short-term Funding; OI: Other Income to Total 
 
 
 
 
